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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
--0000000--

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 18321

ROBERT HICKEN,
Defendant-Respondent.
--0000000--

RESPONDENT' S BRIEF
--0000000--

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent was charged with distribution of a controlled
substance for value, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-378(1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent was tried before a jury on February 17, 1982 in
the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, presiding.

The trial court

issued a final order granting defendant-respondent's Motion to
Dismiss the Information.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court affirming
the trial court's final order granting defendant-respondent's
Motion to Dismiss the Information.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 19, 1981, defendant-respondent Robert Hicken was
at the home of Jerry Middleton in Provo, Utah, at the request of
Jerry Middleton.

Judy Smith was to arrive later.

Mr. Middleton had previously been arrested for the offense of
possession of marijuana.

Officer Markling of the Provo City

Police had agreed with Mr. Middleton that the police would work
with him on his "possession of marijuana" charge if Mr. Middleton
would introduce the police into other instances or identify other
individuals (T. 32).
Judy Smith had been a secretary in the Provo Police Department's Detective Division for a period of approximately two years.
She had no aquaintance with defendant Robert Hicken and had never
seen or observed Mr. Hicken prior to the date charged of October
19, 1981.

Officer Markling had previously informed Miss Smith

that Mr. Middleton would be able to introduce Miss Smith to someone
who would make a buy of narcotics or assist her in making a buy.
Pursuant to Officer Markling's directions, Miss Smith was given
$120.00 and told to be at the residence of Jerry Middleton.

Miss

Smith did not know either Jerry Middleton or the defendant nor had
she any knowledge of the friendship or relationship between Mr.
Middleton and the defendant.
The defendant Robert Hicken had arrived at the home previous
to Miss Smith's arrival.

When Miss Smith arrived, Mr. Hicken was

on the phone talking to someone whose identity was unknown (T. 13).
Prior to any introduction of Mr. Hicken to Miss Smith, Mr. Hicken
and Mr. Middleton started talking about whether a Mr. Larsen would
be home or not (T. 14).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Miss Smith testified under questioning by State's counsel:
A: No. When Mr. Hicken got off the phone Mr. Hicken and
Jerry started talking about whether, I would assume, Mr.
Larsen would be home or not. Things to that nature.

Q:

So they were talking about whether or not Mr. Hicken's
source was at home?

A:

Right.

Q:

Did he attempt to call?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Okay.

What did he say to you as he was calling?

A: He asked me how much I wanted, and I told him that I had
$120, and then he told me that a quarter of a pound would be
-- well, I asked him how much he had first of all.
After some attempts, Mr. Hicken finally contacted the source,

Mr. Larsen.

Miss Smith overheard conversations from the defendant

and Mr. Larsen regarding inquiries on behalf of Miss Smith made by
the defendant.

The conversation was as follows (again under

questioning by State's counsel):

Q:

Did he indicate anything to you about that $150?

A: I told him I only had $120. When he told me I could get
a quarter of a pound for $150 -- Mr. Hicken told me that
he said I could pay the $120 and he would pay $30 to make up
the difference and that I could pay him back later.

Q:

So then did he finally reach who he was trying to get on
the phone, this Mr. Larsen?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Okay.

What happened then?

A: He started talking to him and I heard him say -- ask him
how much a quarter of a pound would be, and then he asked how
much two lids would be, and he turned to me. Mr. Hicken
asked me if I wanted two lids for $95.

Q:

What did you say?

A:

I told him yes I did.
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Q:

What happened then?

A: He told the person
Mr. Hicken told the person on the
phone that we would be right over (T. 15 1. 15 - T. 16 1. 3).
The parties arrived at the Larsen residence and Miss Smith
testified of the conversation therein:

Q:

Okay.

What happened when you got to Mr. Larsen's home?

A: Mr. Larsen let us in and led us into the front room where
he asked Mr. Hicken if he would drive him to the 7-Eleven
before he sold him the stuff.

Q:

Then what happened?

A: Mr. Hicken said that I was the one buying it, and so Mr.
Larse·n said, "Oh." And he went into the back room.

Q:

Who was there?
the Larsens?

Who was there in the front room there at

A: When they led me into the front room there was -- they
introduced me to another man sitting in the front room already.
They introduced me to him as Rex (T. 17).
Miss Smith then testified that Mr. Larsen and Mr. Hicken went
into a back room and returned wherein the defendant sat down by
her and gave to her one of the bags of marijuana.
Miss Smith then gave $100.00 to Mr. Larsen, the source, and
Mr. Larsen returned $5.00 (T. 19 1. 15-20).
Upon cross-examination of Miss Smith, she indicated that the
source, Larsen, had returned from the back room with two baggies
filled with marijuana, and not Mr. Hicken (T. 23 1. 13).
Miss Smith had never known a Bob Hicken prior to that night
nor had any suspicions or knowledge of any dealings in narcotics
or selling or anything of that nature relating to Mr. Hicken (T.
24 1. 20-29).

Mr. Hicken never received possession of the money

and the defendant alleges that he never received possession of any
narcotics.
-4-
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After the testimony of Miss Smith and Officer Markling,
counsel for the defendant motioned the Court to dismiss the Information filed against defendant in that the Information charbed the
defendant with one count of distribution for value of a controlled
substance, to-wit:

Marijuana.

Counsel contended that it appeared

from the evidence, uncontradicted, that Mr. Hicken did not sell
the marijuana to the undercover agent but that at most the defendant had arranged for Miss Smith to purchase the marijuana.
Counsel for the State had argued that the Accomplice Statute,
U.C.A. §76-2-202, allowed the Information to stand,in that,the
Accomplice Statute is applicable to the Controlled Substance Act.
The trial court found that Title 76 of the Utah Criminal Code
applied generally to the acts of the legislature but the Utah
Controlled Substance Act was a specific statute and where the
Controlled Substance Act dealt with the conduct specifically, the
Controlled Substance Act took precedence and controlled.

The

Court found that the defendant was charged with one crime but the
evidence supported another and consequently dismissed the information filed against the defendant.

ARGUMENT
IT WAS ERROR TO CHARGE THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT UNDER §58-378(l)(a)(ii).
The general provisions of the Utah Criminal Code provide in
§76-1-103 as follows:
The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of,
the punishment for and defenses against any offense defined
in this code or, except where otherwise specifically provided
or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside
this code; provided such offense was committed after the
effective date of this code appeared (emphasis added).
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Section

58~37~19

(1953) as amended provides as follows:

It is th~ purpose of this act to regulate and control the
substances designated within §58-37-4, and whenever the
r~quirements proscribe, the offenses defined or the penalties
imposed relating to substances controlled by this act shall
be or appear to be in conflict with Title 51, Chapter 17, or
any other laws of this state, the provisions of this act
shall be controlling (emphasis added).
In the present case, the defendant is charged with the offense
of distribution for value of a controlled substance in violation
of §58-37-B(l)(a)(ii) (1953), as amended.

The defendant contends

and the District Court agreed that the "arranging statute", §5837-8(l)(a)(iv) of the Utah Controlled Substance Act is applicable
under the facts, as presented at trial.

Said section provides:

• • • it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally: (iv) To agree, consent, offer or arrange to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance for value • • .
(emphasis added).
It is clear from the testimony of Judy Smith that the defendant was acting only on behalf of the police officer in contacting
the source and that the police officer,

Mis~

Smith, was the person

to purchase the marijuana and not the defendant.

The defendant

was merely acting in the capacity of arranging for a sale of the
marijuana at the instance and request of the undercover agent,
Judy Smith, and the agent, Jerry Middleton, who was acting under
the direction of the police.

Further, counsel for the State

stipulated in his opening argument to the jury that the defendant
was not "some high-powered drug dealer or some drug pusher."

The

State's counsel argued:
In fact, I am just going to show you this defendant was more
of a middleman. He encouraged and aided and furthered the
drug transaction in violation of law which wouldn't have
occurred if he hadn't been around to make sure the sale went
through • • • he got on the phone and made some arrangements
to buy some marijuana, to get her some marijuana (T. 6).

-6-
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This Court, in Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979),
found that the Controlled Substance Act applied more specifically
to the defendant's offense and took precedence over the Criminal
Code's general forgery statute.
In Helmuth, the petitioner argued that his conviction of
uttering a forged prescription should be dictated and controlled
by the Utah Criminal Code and not by the Utah Controlled Substance

Act.

The defendant's argument in Helmuth was based upon equal
protection.

Specifically, the defendant-petitioner argued the

Utah Criminal Code §76-6-50l(l)(b) controlled the sentencing and
~

that defendant's conduct was proscribed therein as a misdemeanor
and should be treated as such.

The Utah Controlled Substance Act

also applied to the acts of the defendant, but, however made said
conduct a felony.
This Court held as follows:
We recognize the soundness of his (defendant's) contention
that where two interdict the same conduct, but impose
different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser
punishment . • • inasmuch as the former act applies more
specifically to the plaintiff's offense, it takes precedence
over the latter act.
Correlated to the foregoing, it is to be noted that the
legislature has expressly provided in §58-37-19 of the
Controlled Substance Act that 'whenever • • • the penalties
impose relating to substances controlled by this act shall be
or appear to be in conflict with • • • any other laws of this
state, the provisions of this act shall be controlling.'
Thus, even if petitioner were correct in his postulate that
the statute referred to prohibited the same conduct, the
legislature has declared that the provisions of Title 58
Chapter 17, rather than those contained in the Criminal '
Code, are to be applied in offenses relating to narcotic
drugs.
In the instant case, the facts are more applicable and
specifically controlled by the Utah Controlled Substance Act
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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§58-37-S(l)(a)(iv)--Arranging.
Defendant refers the Court to State v. Harrision, 601 P.2d
922 (Utah 1979).

The appellant therein argued that §58-37-

8(1) (a) (iv) was unconstitutionally vague.

This Court, finding

otherwise, defining the arranging statute, stated:
Thus any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by the
act. The citizen of average intelligence is left with no
confusion as to what type of conduct is forbidden.
In Harrison, the defendant was convicted under §58-37-8(1)
(a)(iv) of arranging distribution for value of a controlled
substance.

In that case the Vernal Police Department sent a

police informant to the defendant's residence for the purpose of
purchasing cocaine.

When the informant arrived at the defendant's

home, he was told that the defendant could not supply cocaine but
was told an acquaintance of the defendant's might be able to
furnish a substitute substance.

The defendant took the police

informant to meet the acquaintance by the name of "Suzy" and a
drug transaction ensued between "Suzy" and the police informant.
The facts in that case are strikingly similar to the case of
Harrision where the respondent was approached by a police undercover agent to secure the purchase of marijuana.

The defendant

•

herein, unable or unwilling to accomodate the police undercover
agent, takes the undercover agent to the residence of Mr. Larsen
and a drug transaction occurs between Mr. Larsen (the source) and
the undercover agent.
Section 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv) specifically covers the area
charged herein and preempts the application of the general provisions of the U.tah Criminal Code §76-1-103(1).
-8-

The "arranging"
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statute supplants the "accomplice" statute of the Criminal Code as
applied to the facts herein, State v. Harrison.
Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), under which the defendant was
charged, specifically covers and clearly proscribes the sale of a
controlled substance or possession with intent to sell a
proscribed substance.

See, State v. Mills, 641 P.2d 119 (Utah

1982); State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah 1979); and State v.
Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484 (Utah 1980).
It is accepted in this and other jurisdictions that a specific
statute (arranging) takes precedence over a general statute
(accomplice).

See, Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979);

In Re Smart, 505 P.2d 1979 (Hawaii 1973); and 73 Am.Jur.2d
Statutes §257 (1974)

Under the definition of Harrison, the

Arranging Statute supplements and pre-empts the application of the
Accomplice Statute.
CONCLUSION
The respondent was improperly charged under U.C.A. §58-378(1) (a) (ii).

Section 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv) is applicable in the

instant case and specifically applies to any conduct for which the
defendant is criminally liable.

When the Utah Controlled

Substance Act specifically applies to a specific fact or situation
the Controlled Substance Act takes precedence over and pre-empts
any and all general statutes, including the Accomplice Statute of
the Utah Criminal Code.

The dismissal of the State's Information

against the defendant was properly granted and should not be
disturbed by this Court.
(continued)

-9-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. this

_:d_ day

of July, 1982.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and accurate copy of
the foregciing.to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, and Robert
N. Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Appellant,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid,
this
day of July, 1982.

1.·'
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